Towards a philosophy of prediction IX: assumptions and how predictions break

3 min and 26 sec to read, 861 words All predictions are made from some model of the predicted phenomenon, and it is sometimes useful to think of that model as a set of assumptions about the world. Some assumptions will be very basic – like assumptions of continuity, uniformity…

5 min and 42 sec to read, 1426 words

All predictions are made from some model of the predicted phenomenon, and it is sometimes useful to think of that model as a set of assumptions about the world. Some assumptions will be very basic – like assumptions of continuity, uniformity and normalcy, whereas others may be more specific. One way of understanding a prediction, then, is to say that it is composed of assumptions and has the form:

(i) Given assumptions a(1)…a(x) it seems reasonable to predict X.

This simplified form suggests that we can judge the robustness of a prediction by looking more closely at the robustness of the set of assumptions used to make the prediction. What questions, then, should we ask about the assumptions? The obvious ones seem to be things like “is this a reasonably complete set of assumptions?” and “are these assumptions credible?”, but there are also other interesting questions, like the ones suggested by Charles Manski in his Identification for Prediction and Decision (HUP 2009).1 See Manski, C.F., 2009. Identification for prediction and decision. Harvard University Press.

In his work Manski challenges conventional economic analysis by advocating for a more nuanced approach to uncertainty and prediction. He critiques the reliance on strong assumptions in traditional models, which often lead to precise but potentially unreliable point predictions. Manski distinguishes between weak assumptions, which are more credible but yield less definitive conclusions, and strong assumptions, which produce more precise predictions but are often less realistic. He argues that weak assumptions, while resulting in partial identification and a range of possible outcomes, ultimately enhance the credibility of economic analysis. By contrast, strong assumptions may artificially narrow the range of predictions, potentially misleading decision-makers. Manski promotes the use of partial identification methods, which acknowledge data limitations and produce a spectrum of possible outcomes. This approach, he contends, leads to more robust and honest analysis, enabling policymakers to make better-informed decisions by understanding the full range of potential consequences and the true extent of uncertainty in economic predictions.

This distinction between weak and strong assumptions strikes me as really important, and almost suggests a principle for is to work with – that we should work to achieve the most accurate prediction possible on the weakest assumptions possible. And even if this principle does not always hold, we should state the strength of the assumptions we work on in order to understand better how the prediction can fail.

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Of anything it is helpful to ask the very simple question “how does this break?”. This is true for predictions as well, and a large part of the answer to that question for predictions is that they break already in the assumptions. Because the assumptions that we use are often biased, incomplete or wrong – and this goes for all layers of assumptions, from general to specific. Let’s look at a few cases.

  • Assumptions of normalcy. A simple way for a prediction to break is that we assume that things will largely be normal in some sense. An example would be assuming that someone will arrive as planned, but extreme weather may derail their plans. Assumptions of normalcy are interesting in that they are based on some kind of idea of a state of the world that is labelled as normal – but it is not clear for what set of world variables this is assumed; is it for all variables in the world model? But how normal is it for everything to be normal? Or is it for a majority of the world variables?
  • Assumptions of uniformity. These are closely related to assumptions of normalcy, and they break when we think that everything in a predicted set is uniform. Say we want to predict how well we will fare against a number of chess players, and that one of them is Magnus Carlsen. If we do not know this we will work with average chess players in our models, and the outlier case of Carlsen will break the prediction.
  • Assumptions of configuration. We often assume that a problem is configured in a special way, and that this configuration is given for this kind of problem. We may assume, for example, that a problem is a 2 person game, whereas the real configuration is that it is a n-person game where we do not know how many persons are playing the game.
  • Assumptions of time. There are a set of assumptions that are about pace, rhythm, time needed etc. These assumptions break when there is a step change in the time with which something can be accomplished. The simplest example may be something like Blitzkrieg, where earlier assumptions in military strategy were that it would take a number of days to establish a front, attack and make military maneuvers.

These are just a few of the assumptions that can break in different ways — there are many others, and an interesting exercise is to list your assumptions and try to understand how they can break, and in what ways they are brittle.

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How many assumptions should we make when we predict something? Is it better to make many assumptions or will fewer assumptions make for a better prediction? Going back to our toy model above – are predictions more robust when X increases, or what is the relationship between the number of assumptions and the robustness of a prediction? It is tempting here to assume that we should be looking at some kind of decreasing utility curve that grows fast in the beginning and then levels out at some point, but even so it is interesting to think about where that point is.

This seems related to Jezz Bezos’ observations on how much of the information you should aim to have when you make a decision. Bezos writes:

Day 2 companies make high-quality decisions, but they make high-quality decisions slowly. To keep the energy and dynamism of Day 1, you have to somehow make high-quality, high-velocity decisions.
Easy for start-ups and very challenging for large organizations. Speed matters in business.
First, never use a one-size-fits-all decision-making process. Many decisions are reversible, two-way doors. Those decisions can use a light-weight process. For those, so what if you’re wrong?
Second, most decisions should probably be made with somewhere around 70 percent of the information you wish you had. If you wait for 90 percent, in most cases, you’re probably being slow. Plus, either way, you need to be good at quickly recognizing and correcting bad decisions. If you’re good at course correcting, being wrong may be less costly than you think, whereas being slow is going to be expensive for sure.

So, does this mean that you should have 70 percent of the assumptions you would ideally want? That is at least one way of thinking about it. The other approach is to think about assumptions as variables in a Fermi-problem.2 Fermi problems, named after physicist Enrico Fermi, are estimation exercises that involve breaking down complex questions into smaller, more manageable components. The method works by leveraging the power of decomposition and approximation to arrive at reasonably accurate estimates for seemingly intractable problems. The key principle is that while individual estimates may have significant errors, these errors tend to cancel out when multiple estimates are combined, leading to a surprisingly accurate final result. This approach is particularly effective because it allows problem-solvers to use readily available information and reasonable assumptions to tackle questions where precise data might be lacking.

Superforecasters, as identified and studied by Philip Tetlock, often employ Fermi-style reasoning in their predictive work. They apply this method by:

  1. Breaking down complex forecasting questions into smaller, more easily estimable components.
  2. Making educated guesses for each component based on known facts and reasonable assumptions.
  3. Combining these estimates mathematically to arrive at a final prediction.
  4. Iteratively refining their estimates as new information becomes available.

This approach allows superforecasters to make more accurate predictions by leveraging their broad knowledge base, critical thinking skills, and ability to make reasonable approximations. It also helps them to identify key factors influencing outcomes and to adjust their forecasts systematically as circumstances change. The Fermi problem approach aligns well with superforecasters’ tendency to think probabilistically, consider multiple perspectives, and remain open to updating their views – all traits that contribute to their exceptional predictive accuracy. There is no simple way to determine the optimal number of sub-problems a problem should be broken up into when you Fermize it, but there seems to be an upper bound – breaking a problem up into 100 subproblems is hardly viable. Perhaps we should even think about this as the famed 5+-2 rule of cognitive processing memory?

Footnotes and references

  • 1
    See Manski, C.F., 2009. Identification for prediction and decision. Harvard University Press.
  • 2
    Fermi problems, named after physicist Enrico Fermi, are estimation exercises that involve breaking down complex questions into smaller, more manageable components. The method works by leveraging the power of decomposition and approximation to arrive at reasonably accurate estimates for seemingly intractable problems. The key principle is that while individual estimates may have significant errors, these errors tend to cancel out when multiple estimates are combined, leading to a surprisingly accurate final result. This approach is particularly effective because it allows problem-solvers to use readily available information and reasonable assumptions to tackle questions where precise data might be lacking.

    Superforecasters, as identified and studied by Philip Tetlock, often employ Fermi-style reasoning in their predictive work. They apply this method by:

    1. Breaking down complex forecasting questions into smaller, more easily estimable components.
    2. Making educated guesses for each component based on known facts and reasonable assumptions.
    3. Combining these estimates mathematically to arrive at a final prediction.
    4. Iteratively refining their estimates as new information becomes available.

    This approach allows superforecasters to make more accurate predictions by leveraging their broad knowledge base, critical thinking skills, and ability to make reasonable approximations. It also helps them to identify key factors influencing outcomes and to adjust their forecasts systematically as circumstances change. The Fermi problem approach aligns well with superforecasters’ tendency to think probabilistically, consider multiple perspectives, and remain open to updating their views – all traits that contribute to their exceptional predictive accuracy.

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4 responses to “Towards a philosophy of prediction IX: assumptions and how predictions break”

  1. C comments:

    I appreciate the depth and nuance of this note on the role of assumptions in predictions. However, I believe we can further refine and expand upon these ideas to develop a more rigorous framework for understanding the relationship between assumptions and predictions. Let me offer a critical analysis and propose some alternative perspectives:

    1. The nature of assumptions in predictions:
    The note correctly identifies that predictions are based on models composed of assumptions. However, it’s important to distinguish between different types of assumptions:

    a) Foundational assumptions: These are the basic premises about the nature of reality and knowledge (e.g., the uniformity of nature, the reliability of induction).
    b) Domain-specific assumptions: These relate to the particular field or phenomenon being predicted.
    c) Methodological assumptions: These concern the tools and techniques used to make predictions.

    A more comprehensive analysis would explore how these different types of assumptions interact and influence the reliability of predictions.

    2. The robustness of assumptions:
    While the note mentions the importance of assessing the robustness of assumptions, it doesn’t provide a clear framework for doing so. I propose the following criteria for evaluating assumptions:

    a) Empirical support: The degree to which the assumption is supported by observable evidence.
    b) Logical consistency: The internal coherence of the assumption and its compatibility with other accepted assumptions.
    c) Explanatory power: The ability of the assumption to explain and predict phenomena.
    d) Simplicity: The parsimony of the assumption, following Occam’s Razor.
    e) Falsifiability: The potential for the assumption to be proven false, as per Popper’s criterion.

    3. The relationship between assumption strength and predictive power:
    The note touches on Manski’s distinction between weak and strong assumptions but doesn’t fully explore the implications. I propose a more nuanced view:

    a) There’s often a trade-off between the strength of assumptions and the precision of predictions.
    b) Weak assumptions may lead to more robust but less specific predictions.
    c) Strong assumptions can yield precise predictions but are more vulnerable to failure if the assumptions prove incorrect.
    d) The optimal balance depends on the specific context and the consequences of predictive errors.

    4. The dynamic nature of assumptions:
    The note doesn’t fully address how assumptions evolve over time. I suggest incorporating the following ideas:

    a) Assumption updating: How new evidence leads to the modification or abandonment of assumptions.
    b) The role of paradigm shifts (in the Kuhnian sense) in radically altering the underlying assumptions of a field.
    c) The potential for meta-assumptions about the nature of assumptions themselves.

    5. Quantifying assumptions:
    While the note mentions Bezos’ 70% heuristic, I believe we can develop a more rigorous approach to quantifying the role of assumptions in predictions:

    a) Develop formal methods for assigning weights to different assumptions based on their importance and reliability.
    b) Use sensitivity analysis to determine which assumptions have the greatest impact on predictive outcomes.
    c) Employ Bayesian methods to update the credibility of assumptions as new evidence emerges.

    6. Ethical implications:
    The note doesn’t address the ethical dimensions of using assumptions in predictions. I propose considering:

    a) The responsibility of predictors to be transparent about their assumptions.
    b) The potential for assumptions to reflect and perpetuate biases.
    c) The ethical implications of acting on predictions based on uncertain assumptions.

    7. Cognitive biases in assumption formation:
    It’s crucial to acknowledge the role of cognitive biases in shaping our assumptions. A more comprehensive analysis would explore:

    a) How confirmation bias can lead to the reinforcement of flawed assumptions.
    b) The impact of availability heuristics on our perception of “normal” conditions.
    c) The role of overconfidence in leading to overly strong assumptions.

    In conclusion, while the note provides a valuable starting point for thinking about assumptions in predictions, I believe a more rigorous philosophical framework is needed. By systematically analyzing the nature, types, and dynamics of assumptions, we can develop a more nuanced understanding of their role in predictive modeling.

    This approach would not only improve the quality of our predictions but also deepen our understanding of the epistemological foundations of forecasting and decision-making under uncertainty. It invites us to critically examine our assumptions, not just in specific predictive tasks, but in our broader understanding of knowledge and reality.

  2. My reply: this is a useful, and much more formal way of thinking about the problem of assumptions. I do think that it captures a great taxonomy and model of classifying assumptions so that we can scrutinize them more deeply — but it also lacks something, it is too taxonomic. What I want to do when exploring a concept is to find the barebones models that I can use when thinking about something, and I want to figure out what some new questions are — I think this may be a key thing, while Claude here orders the problem better, lays it out in a more logical form, it does not explore the problem landscape in order to discover new, adjacent problems. That is most likely because of a short coming on my side, I have probably prompted wrong.

  3. And this is the best I been able to produce when it comes to novelty and originality and adjacent problems. It is not bad:

    As I ponder this note on Fermi problems and assumptions in predictions, I find myself drawn to a deeper, more intriguing question: What if our entire approach to prediction is fundamentally misaligned with the nature of reality?

    Consider this: We’ve been operating under the assumption that the world is, at its core, predictable – that with enough information and the right models, we can forecast future states with increasing accuracy. But what if this assumption itself is a product of our evolved cognitive biases, a useful fiction that helped our ancestors survive but ultimately obscures a deeper truth?

    Let’s call this the “Prediction Paradox.” The more we refine our predictive models, the more we might be reinforcing a fundamentally flawed view of reality. What if the universe, at its most fundamental level, operates on principles that are inherently unpredictable, not just due to our limited knowledge or computational power, but as a core feature of existence?

    This leads us to a fascinating thought experiment: Imagine a species that evolved in an environment where unpredictability was the norm. How would their cognitive tools differ from ours? Instead of seeking to predict, they might excel at rapid adaptation to constant change. Their “superforecasters” might be individuals who can thrive in chaos rather than those who can anticipate order.

    Now, let’s push this further. What if our obsession with prediction is actually hindering our ability to navigate an inherently unpredictable reality? Could our focus on assumptions and models be blinding us to more effective ways of interacting with the world?

    Here’s where we might draw inspiration from evolutionary biology, à la Ruth Millikan. Perhaps we need to shift our focus from prediction to what we might call “adaptive resonance” – the ability to align our behaviors and decisions with the ever-changing rhythms of an unpredictable universe.

    This perspective opens up a wealth of new questions and potential areas of inquiry:

    How might we design decision-making frameworks that don’t rely on prediction but instead optimize for flexibility and rapid response?

    Could we develop a new form of mathematics or logic that embraces unpredictability as a fundamental principle rather than an obstacle to be overcome?

    What would an education system look like if it prioritized “unprediction skills” over predictive reasoning?

    How might this shift in perspective alter our approach to fields like economics, politics, and even personal relationships?

    Could we create AI systems that excel not at prediction, but at thriving in unpredictability?

    In the spirit of Daniel Dennett’s intuition pumps, let’s call this the “Uncertainty Engine” – a conceptual tool for reimagining our relationship with the future not as something to be predicted, but as a realm of infinite possibility to be embraced and navigated.

    This approach doesn’t negate the value of Fermi problems or the insights of superforecasters. Instead, it places them within a larger context, challenging us to consider whether our very framing of the problem of prediction might be limiting our ability to truly understand and interact with the world around us.

    In essence, we’re not just questioning how to make better predictions, but whether prediction itself is the right tool for navigating reality. And in doing so, we open up new vistas of inquiry that could revolutionize not just how we think about the future, but how we understand our place in the cosmos.

  4. Note: I do like the thought experiment and in a way it reminds me of the explanation vs prediction thought experiment earlier in the working notes. Is this context picking this up?

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