• In understanding organisations, one of the core questions you should ask yourself is what capabilities an organisation has. What can it do routinely and well? This is no simple question, and a good way to approach it is to ask what an ideal type organisation should be able to do routinely and well and then decompose those capabilities into a skill tree.

    Skill trees are useful mental models that help us understand how different skills build capabilities, and what progression and mutual dependencies exist in a particular skill space.

    The more I have looked into the question of capability, the more I have become convinced that capabilities are grossly underestimated, especially by people who otherwise have a health respect for planning and setting clear objectives with key results. The focus on objectives seems right – we should be able to answer the question of what we want to get done – but it over-indexes on two often dubious assumptions: that the world is somewhat predictable and that all objectives are equally achievable by all organisations.

    The second is the most surprising: an organisation that sets its objectives without ever asking what capabilities it needs to develop to reach those objectives is essentially engaging in organizational daydreaming, not planning. Yet – how often do you ask yourself if you can really do something that you set out to do? It is almost as if asking that question demonstrates a lack of faith in yourself and the organisation – which is, of course, completely crazy.

    Don’t get me wrong. Objectives should not be restrained by current capabilities, but they should inform investments in capabilities going forward. And capabilities are not just about resources either. The question ”are we adequately resourced to do this” does not in any way replace the question ”are we capable of doing this” – since the second question is about the way in which resources are deployed and about what you choose not to be able to do.

    So, let us look at a simple skill tree for a government affairs organisation:

    A simple skill tree model for a government affairs org

    This simple skill tree gives you a sense of what a government affairs organisation should be able to do, at a minimum. It also gives you a template against which you can assess your own organisation, finding out what skills you still need to build or buy.

    (The choice of building or buying, by the way, is one that is important to get right. Building compounds over time buying does not – or at least not as fast.)

    What this skill tree does is also that it teases out a shared model of the skills that leadership expect a policy team to bring to the table. This is no small thing, since it allows for an interesting conversation about what skills sit where in an organisation as well. Each skill tree can then be studied with increased resolution and discussed in detail.

    A good New Years exercise is to draft your own skill tree for your organisation and sort out what you need to build to get to where you need to be to reach your objectives.

    Building skill and capability, incidentally, also means you become more robust and resilient – your ability to react to an increasingly uncertain context increases and you set yourself up to be able to adapt and change. A little more focus on capabilities and a little less focus on objectives is a good way to inoculate yourself and your organization against goal fixation.

    Gary Klein describes this well in his book Seeing What Other’s Don’t. He notes that in most organisations someone who challenges goals is seen as a disruptive force, and excluded from the organizational thought processes. One reason for this is the one-sided focus on objectives and goals, and focusing a little bit more on capabilities is a good way to deal with this.

    Summing up, then, try this for fun:

    • Use skill trees to understand your organisation and to develop it.
    • Complement objectives with a discussion about capabilities.
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  • Sweden is currently in the midst of a public crisis of confidence in the country’s leadership, especially as pertains to the handling of the Covid-19 pandemic. Two ministers and one Director General have been found to flout the public guidelines on the pandemic. Prime Minister Stefan Löfvén visited a shopping center before Christmas for some Christmas shopping, Minister of Justice Morgan Johansson did the same but after Christmas during a general sale the government had tried to stop – and then news reached us that the Director General responsible for Crisis Management had left the country to celebrate Christmas in Spain, on the Canary Islands.

    Public reaction has been “social media harsh”, but surprisingly “mainstream media muted”. In the UK, Canada and Ireland public figures found in violation of the pandemic guidelines have been summarily fired and pushed out. In Sweden the odds are, right now, that there will be no consequences at all for any of the three. Let’s put that in numbers – there is a less than a 10% chance that Morgan Johansson will have been fired or stepped down before end of January. There is a less than 1% chance that Stefan Löfvén will be voted out of office by that same timeline. The probability that Dan Eliasson is sacrificed is slightly higher – but no higher than 20%.

    There are several things to unpack here — the Swedish exceptionalism, the real reason the opposition is quiet, the reasons normally intelligent people act in this way — and all of them seem related to a somewhat amorphous phenomenon that we have heard referred to as “pandemic fatigue”.

    Pandemic fatigue can be summed up as the general feeling that the restrictions put on society in order to manage the pandemic are simply too much, or have been going on for too long. It is the collective “enough already!” that simmers beneath a lot of the public debate, and is increasingly finding its way into the leadership ranks as well. The vaccine is here, and that has just worsened the feeling that the restrictions we see are overbearing and unnecessary.

    Viruses infect human bodies, Pandemics infect institutions.

    The phenomenon of pandemic fatigue is one of collective attention, and is interestingly related to our ability to interact with institutions. John Searle famously noted that institutions are objects of collective intentionality, and the pandemic has emerged as a core central institution in our societies. It competes as capital P Pandemic with other institutions, such as the Economy, Freedom and Solidarity. It interferes with Law and Democracy, and has started to influence the overall dynamic between electorate and the overall governance of our democracies.

    The emergence of the pandemic as institution has shown philosophers like Agamben to be profoundly mistaken. The idea that Power manufactures crisis to keep society in constant state of emergency is simply not true – what we see instead is that crisis generates competing institutions. The difference is stark – in a state of emergency all institutions are put on hold, suspended, but what we see is rather than institutions are reframed in the light of the specific form that this crisis has taken.

    One reason is duration. This crisis has been longer than many others, and more acute – and this in itself is one reason that the reaction is so stark. Protests against restrictions are seen as unreasonable and crazy exhibits of irrational self-destructive behavior, but are really institutional tensions playing out in a power struggle between different centers of power.

    The idea of a cure is always snake oil.

    Now, let’s be clear: if we want to manage the pandemic responsibly, the restrictions, at least as they have been used in Sweden so far, are absolutely reasonable. The Swedish Corona-strategy is a negotiation of institutional tensions and epistemological uncertainties. Is it successful? We will see – and we will have to discuss that in-depth over the coming years. I have said I will have a view at the end of 2021, and intend to follow up then. But the point I am getting at here is different: the negotiation of institutional tensions has broken down, and as a result the strategy is essentially dead in the water.

    The actions of the Swedish political leadership show that our leaders have lost all intentionality when it comes to the Pandemic as institution. Collective intentionality is breaking down. And this is the point at which the Swedish Government is finally getting emergency powers that will enable it to enforce much harsher restrictions. The harm this can do to the legitimacy of our democratic process cannot be overestimated.

    Ok, let’s sum up.

    The Pandemic is an emerging institution, dependent on collective intentionality. That intentionality is now breaking down – partly due to competition with other institutions, partly due to the lack of any intentionality from Swedish political leadership. This comes at a time where a new law will give Swedish government more power to enforce harder restrictions. The democratic harms that this risks creating are great – and suddenly the Pandemic starts infecting other institutions as well: Parliament, Government and Law. A weird meta-pandemic feeding on the break-down of the Pandemic as institution weakens institutions across the board. We will see a pandemic echo of sickness in our international and national institutions for a long time to come.

    A virus infects human bodies, a pandemic infects institutions.

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  • One of the core tools we need to use when we try to understand public policy issues is what underlies them — what are people truly concerned about when they are concerned about a specific issue? One way of approaching such issues is to try to really decompose them into component concerns.

    Let’s take an example: why are we concerned about privacy? If we decompose general privacy concerns into their subcomponent parts we might get something like the below causal structure. As we do this exercise we essentially are constructing a hypothesis that can then be refined and tested in different ways.

    A simple causal tree

    The reason something like this is helpful is that it serves as a reference class of concerns for any focus grouping or interviews. If you start interviewing and examining without something like this you are likely to end up with just testing a part of the causal tree, and you may not be able to weight concerns in design and product development responses.

    You may, let’s say, over-index on confidentiality and miss autonomy and attention entirely.

    A few caveats: the reality is that beliefs or concerns are not as clearly structured as this — in most of use these are all related: we are worried about what people know about us because we worry about it being used to distract and manipulate us in ways that weaken our rights. That is not a reason not to examine the causal tree here — because unless we have a hypothesis about the belief structure we are addressing we are likely to end up in what we can call the “propositional fallacy” – the erroneous model in which beliefs are isolated, atomic propositions.

    In this model public opinion is modeled as a set of propositions (p1…pN) that are individually unrelated, rather than a network of beliefs that are all related in different ways. Exposing trees like this is a way to start examining belief networks rather than individual propositions. And building these trees allows one to compare both quantitative and qualitative data against a hypothesis.

    A tree like this is easy to design in a group exercise, but best prepared by everyone making their own tree without group think before the workshop. The workshop is then additive – everyone’s trees are added and built out with new ideas into as rich a causal structure as possible. That structure should then be translated into questions.

    The patterns of public opinion are complex.

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  • One of the recent books that has made a strong impression on me is Richard Rumelt’s book on strategy – Good Strategy, Bad Strategy – and the reason is that it provides such a clear and effective mental model of what you need to do if you want to be a strategic thinker. Rumelt notes that there is a *ton* of really bad strategy around and that this has cast doubt over the whole idea that we should have strategies at all, but he then goes on to suggest a down-to-earth operationalized definition of strategy that really merits internalizing. This is the portal quote:

    “A good strategy has an essential logical structure that I call the kernel. The kernel of a strategy contains three elements: a diagnosis, a guiding policy, and coherent action.”

    Richard Rumelt, from Good Strategy Bad Strategy.

    It is that simple. And yet, I think that many, many organisations tend to get it wrong in all three elements. First, very few bother to even do the diagnosis – ask the broad and ridiculously important question of “what is going on here” – and jump directly into objectives. Note that Rumelt does not mention objectives. He notes that the diagnosis needs to really grapple with obstacles to getting what you want.

    This is key. If there are no obstacles, then you don’t need a strategy. You just need to wish for it and it will come true. Usually, that is not the case though – and a strategy is the best way of handling what stands between you and your goal.

    Obstacles are best attacked through the identification of advantage. Rumelt, again:

    “A good guiding policy tackles the obstacles identified in the diagnosis by creating or drawing upon sources of advantage. Indeed, the heart of the matter in strategy is usually advantage. Just as a lever uses mechanical advantage to multiply force, strategic advantage multiplies the effectiveness of resources and/or actions.”

    Ibid.

    Again – seemingly obvious, but really hard to find in the wild. Can you immediately tell me what your organisation’s sources of advantage are?

    Second, few organisations understand what a guiding policy is, how it sums up the organisation’s attitude to the environment and obstacles identified in the diagnosis. A guiding policy is where you ensure that you are clear about what you will not do.

    “Good strategy requires leaders who are willing and able to say no to a wide variety of actions and interests. Strategy is at least as much about what an organization does not do as it is about what it does.”

    Ibid

    The policy is what helps you discern what you will not do and what you will focus on. This is important. A guiding policy defines a stance, a position from which you will tackle your challenges. It almost reminds me of the different stances in martial arts – you can take any one of them to face your opponent and all of them express a different attitude and state of mind.

    An aside: here there is an other observation that is interesting to think about — Miyamoto Musashi notes in the Book of Five Rings that the most difficult stance to face is that of no-stance, where it is impossible to discern what the opponent is thinking, or what diagnosis they have (indeed, the policy reveals the diagnosis, and the coherent actions reveal the policy – so when reverse engineering a strategy start from asking “what coherent action is my opponent taking?”).

    Your stance then defines your actions and is the testing ground for proposed tactics — does the action resonate with the policy or is it incoherent? A lot of organisations will through the kitchen sink at the problem, exhibiting not only incoherence, but inconsistency over time as well. At the very limit this becomes a strategy – the madman’s stance, as developed by Thomas Schelling – but before you reach that point (where the enemy will be paralyzed by their inability to see any pattern in what you do) you will be grossly inefficient.

    So few people get these three, seemingly simple, steps right. It is a nice exercise to think through and look at how they apply to you or any organisation you are interested in. Do they have a good strategy or a bad one?

    A strategy, then, is a pattern, and at the limits the complete lack of a pattern is also a strategy – but broken, incoherent and inconsistent patterns are not strategic.

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  • I don’t know if I am an outlier, but it has taken me a long time to realize the value there is in developing personal workflow routines. Ideas about how you do something – write an article, draft a blog post or an issue of a newsletter or even start and finish a book.

    I have always seen the debate between outliners and pantsers in writing as a largely personal style issue, but there may be more to it. The outliners may actually have an argument not for outlines as much as for routine workflows – and the pantsers simply have another routine (sit down, write, rewrite and go from there). Both are workflows with rigor and robustness — they are just different.

    An idea that occurred to me today was that it may be interesting to document and reshape some of the workflows that I have developed “naively” over time and see if that can improve my output. I am currently not happy with my production function, as Tyler Cowen would put it, and need to figure out ways to do things better, and more routinely.

    One is writing a blog in English, so here goes.

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  • Efter snart 13 år på Google är det dags att gå vidare. Det känns nästan overkligt att säga det – men från och med i slutet av november kommer jag inte längre att arbeta på det företag jag sett växa från runt 10 000 personer till mer än 150 000 – där jag varit med och anställt mer än 200 personer och fått bygga team både i USA och Europa, träffat ministrar, blivit utfrågad i parlament och sett hur Googles produkter och tjänster revolutionerat vardagen för småföretag och vanliga användare. (Däri döljer sig en bok.)

    Google är, och förblir, ett fantastiskt företag. Men just att det känns overkligt att tänka sig att lämna är förstås signalen som ytterst betyder att det är precis det man måste göra.

    Och ibland kan man få ett erbjudande som man inte kan säga nej till.

    För mig var det när jag blev kontaktad av Stripe, och fick möjligheten att bygga upp deras globala tech-policyteam. Stripe är ett ungt företag som vill öka Internets BNP – och som eliminerar komplexitet i de finansiella flödena – men det är mycket mer än så. Det är ett långsiktigt infrastrukturprojekt – med två grundare som skapat ett företag och en kultur som saknar motstycke. Stay tuned! Jag börjar i december!

    För mig är det här ett nytt äventyr, och det är en möjlighet att bygga något från början med en enastående grupp människor, och dessutom i ett företag som jag tror har potential att skapa något verkligt viktigt. Det är också en chans att bygga på gamla erfarenheter och göra helt nya misstag! Vad kunde väl vara bättre?

    Onwards!

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  • Sean Carrolls podcast är alltid värd att lyssna till. I ett av de senaste avsnitten intervjuar han sin namne, Sean B Carroll som är utvecklingsbiolog och evolutionsforskare om slumpens roll i evolutionen. Sean B är kanske mest känd som en av de biologer som varit med och utforskat evo-devo och de mekanismer som lägger emfas över den genetiska koden för att uttrycka olika egenskaper, men nu har han koncentrerat sig i en ny bok på att utforska slumpen. Det finns en mängd rika mentala modeller i konversationen, men det som fastnade mest hos mig var att Sean B berättade att de mutationer som sker i varje barn (30-40 st om jag förstod rätt) sker för att det vid gentranskriptionen ibland är så att kvantfluktuationer i väteatomen får genomslag; en hisnande insikt som knyter samman fundamental fysik med individuell biologisk variation på ett vackert sätt.

    Mutationshastigheter var en en annan intressant aspekt, hur snabbt olika system muterar varierar enormt mellan exempelvis virus och människor. Här finns mer att lära. Skall köpa boken och rapportera åter.

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  • Hur påverkar sociala medier politiken? Den mer eller mindre etablerade ståndpunkten just nu skulle kunna summeras upp ungefär såhär:

    (i) Sociala medier ökar polariseringen, löser upp den gemensamma ram av fakta som politiken behöver och exponerar den politiska processen för olika typer av manipulation.

    Mot detta kan man ställa en mer positiv bild som skulle kunna låta ungefär såhär:

    (ii) Sociala medier ökar deltagandet i den politiska processen och sänker trösklarna för medborgare att ta del i det offentliga samtalet.

    I konflikten mellan de här olika ståndpunkterna finns en mängd intressanta argument att utforska, men det som intresserar mig mer är vilka argument som helt missats i debatten. En av de frågor som utforskats relativt litet handlar om den politiska konkurrensen – om inflödet av nya politiska aktörer i den etablerade offentliga sfären.

    Just detta har studerats i en relativt nyligen utgiven vetenskaplig artikel som fokuserar på Twitter, och på donationer till politiker. I materialet har forskarna tittat på vad som händer när en ny politiker öppnar ett Twitterkonto – påverkas donationerna alls? Och finns det en skillnad mellan vad som händer när en etablerad politiker öppnar ett Twitterkonto? Svaret är intressant, och det är värt att läsa hela sammanfattningen:

    “Political campaigns are among the most sophisticated marketing exercises in the United States. As part of their marketing communication strategy, an increasing number of politicians adopt social media to inform their constituencies. This study documents the returns from adopting a new technology, namely Twitter, for politicians running for Congress by focusing on the change in campaign contributions received. We compare weekly donations received just before and just after a politician opens a Twitter account in regions with high and low levels of Twitter penetration, controlling for politician-month fixed effects. Specifically, over the course of a political campaign, we estimate that the differential effect of opening a Twitter account in regions with high vs low levels of Twitter penetration amounts to an increase of 0.7-2% in donations for all politicians and 1-3.1% for new politicians, who were never elected to the Congress before. In contrast, the effect of joining Twitter for experienced politicians remains negligibly small. We find some evidence consistent with the explanation that the effect is driven by new information about the candidates, e.g., the effect is primarily driven by new donors rather than past donors, by candidates without Facebook accounts and tweeting more informatively. Overall, our findings imply that social media can intensify political competition by lowering costs of disseminating information for new entrants to their constituents and thus may reduce the barriers to enter politics.”

    Sociala medier ökar alltså politisk konkurrens genom att låta nya politiska röster komma till tals – och gynnar helt nya politiker mer än etablerade aktörer. Det i sin tur betyder att sociala medier har potential att öka omsättningen i det politiska systemet. Dessutom är det ofta nya donatorer – vilket betyder att det politiska engagemanget (mätt i donationer, men det är en okej proxy) också ökar.

    Vi övervärderar förmodligen den kausala länken mellan sociala medier och polarisering [1] och undervärderar hur sociala medier kan öka omsättningen i ett politiskt system och syresätta det.

    Läs mer (och en bonus i en föredömligt uttömmande bibliografi):

    • Petrova, Maria and Sen, Ananya and Yildirim, Pinar, Social Media and Political Contributions: The Impact of New Technology on Political Competition (May 14, 2020). Management Science, forthcoming , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2836323 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2836323
    • [1] Den intresserade bör läsa Hugo Merciers Not Born Yesterday (skrev om den under strecket här)
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  • I Nelson Goodmans Ways of Worldmaking (1978) finns en intressant diskussion om hur vi formar världar genom olika sorters drag. Som en sorts korollarium till det resonemanget noterar han också att kunskap inte handlar om vad som är sant, utan vad som passar in i en given världsbild.

    Det är en sorts koherensteoretisk syn på kunskap, men den formulerar det pregnant. Det är extra tydligt i de diskussioner om filterbubblor och desinformation som nu förs i alla möjliga olika forum. Det man kan konstatera är att desinformation inte fungerar om den inte redan passar in i den världsbild som mottagaren har.

    Goodmans underskattade lilla bok om att skapa världar

    Det i sin tur betyder att den som vill bekämpa konspirationsteorier, bekämpar hela världsbilder – inte individuella uppfattningar. Alltför ofta riktar diskussionen in sig på någon del i pusslet, och misslyckas – eftersom det inte finns någon annan bit som passar in just där.

    Den som vill lösa upp konspirationsteorier och bekämpa desinformation måste hitta pusselbitar som passar in. Kanske kan det betyda att det krävs ett antal olika övergångsstadier innan vi når till en gemensam världsbild. Den som tror att det går att gå från QAnon-troende till modern liberal i ett svep bedrar sig. Det krävs en serie transformationer för att nå fram till den gemensam syn (vilken denna nu är). Och kanske krävs det en dubbel rörelse både från oss som ser konspirationsteorin och den som fastnat i den? Inte mot konspirationsteorin, men mot de övertygelser och rädslor som informerar den?

    Goodman påpekar också att vi alla börjar från en egen värld som vi sopat ihop av litet allt möjligt som vi hittat vid vägkanten. Denna värld, vår egen värld, är också ett pussel av bitar som vi passat samman bäst vi kan. En del av intelligensen är förmågan att betona om inom den, deformera den, ersätta vissa delar med andra. Det är ett komplext arbete, med ett ganska halvdant utgångsmaterial.

    Våra världar är ständiga renoveringsprojekt, och ibland påminner skillnaden mellan den liberala demokratins nuvarande inkarnation och konspirationsteorierna mest om spänningen mellan “vitt och fräscht” och den med småting och prydnader fyllda gamla lägenheten. Det vore intressant att se hur konspirationsteoretiker bor.

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  • Hur mäter man osäkerhet och vad kan man säga om hur osäker världen är, eller blir, över tid? En essä om detta i Kvartal.

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